Ratan Lal Chakraborty
The Battle of Plassey and the Battle of Boxar were the imperial wars between the East India Company and the Mughal authority, which in turn gave the Company a legal status in Bengal. But, to consolidate their power in rural Bengal, the Company had to face resistance from the local Chiefs, Rajas and people. Although, many of these resistance movements sprung up owing to the oppressions of the Company’s local agents, yet the Company’s revenue policy and their support to the local agents were also responsible for them. Like Fakir Sanyasi movement (1760-1800)[For details, see Ratan Lal Chakraborty, ‘Some Aspects of the Fakir-Sannyasi Movement’, Journal of the Bangladesh Itihas Samiti (in Bengali), vol. 3 and 4 (1974-75), PP. 43-52. ], and Shamsher Gazi’s revolt (1767-68)[See J. E. Webster, Eastern Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers, Noakhali, (Allahabad, 1911), pp. 22-23.], the Chakma rising may also be considered as an early resistance to the Company’s rule in Chittagong region. The topography of the Chittagong Hill Tracts had helped the Chakmas to launch guerrilla warfare against the well-armed Company’s army. Attempts have been made in this paper to analyse the causes and nature of the Chakma resistance. In order to form a comprehensive idea about the causes, it may be worthwhile to briefly discuss the pattern of the livelihood of the people of Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Without entering into an anthropological discourse about the people of Chittagong Hill Tracts, it can safely be said that they were Chakmas in tribe and were the early Arakanese settlers in that area. These people employed quasi Muhammadan nomenclatures. They fancied to keep their names after the ruling Mughals [J. B. Harrison, ‘Arakan’ Encyclopaedia of Islam, (Leiden, 1960), vol. I. p. 606 ]. The principal leaders of the Chakmas, who fought against the Company, were Sher Daulat Khan, Jan Baksh Khan and Ranu Khan. Jan Baksh Khan was the son of Sher Daulat Khan [For details, see T, H. Lewin. The Hill Tracts of Chittagong and the dwellers therein, Calcutta, 1861, pp. 21-21. ]. But the identity of Ranu Khan [For Ranu Khan’s geneology see Satish Chandra Ghosh, The Chakma Nation (in Bengali), Calcutta, and C. S. P. 74] and his connection with the hill Chiefs raises some confusion. It is found in the Chittagong District Record, available at the Bangladesh Secretariat Record Room, that Ranu Khan was the naib of Sukdeo Roy of pargona Rajenagar of chakla Rangunia in the province of Islamabad [Darkhaste of Khoshal Chand Wadahdhar, 12 August, 1781, Bangladesh Secretariat Records (here after abbreviated as BSR)]. Chittagong, vol. 462, pp. 125-26.] . Captain T. H. Lewin and Satish Chandra Ghosh, the two authoritative writers on Hill Chittagong, are at one on the point that Ranu Khan was a relation of Sher Daulat Khan [See T H Lewin, The Hill Tracts of Chittagong. p. 22. Satish Chandra Ghosh, The Chakma Nation, p. 74.]. Pierre Bassaignet has described Ranu Khan as the brother-in -law (sister’s husband) of Jan Baksh Khan [Pierre Bassaignet, Tribesmen of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, The Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1958, p. 93.]. But he did not mention the sources where from he got this information. Most probably Ranu Khan was a relation of Sher Daulat Khan who served as his principal Diwan and general. After the death of Sher Daulat Khan in 1782 A. D. Jan Baksh Khan succeeded him and Ranu became his Chief naib.
As regards to their early connection with the Mughals, it appears that Jalal Khan, the Chief of the independent Chakma tribe, obtained a permission from the Emperor Farrukhsiyar in 1713 A. D. to trade with the people of the plains in articles like dried fish, hens, salt, molasses, tobacco, black cloth etc., which would not be produced in the hills, on voluntary payment of a tribute in cotton [For details, see Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, The Revenue Administration of the East India Company in Chittagong, University of Chittagong, 1971, pp. 168-69. ] . But this tribute was very irregularly paid and ultimately Jalal Khan violated his agreement and in consequence of an inevitable attack by the Mughals Jalal khan fled to Arakan. This agreement was again renewed by Shermast Khan, another Chief from Arakan, who agreed to pay the tribute and in return he received a grant of wasteland in Chittagong for which separate revenue was to be paid. [ See R. H Sneyd Hutchinson, Eastern Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Allahabad, 1909, p. 22.] From that time onward the hill people, through local stewards, paid only a nominal tribute in cotton to the Mughal authority out of their total production in the sterile and hilly lands. Like the primitive system of cultivation as the Coomry of south India, the Chena of Ceylon, the Tong-gyan of Burma and the Gainges of the Philippine Islands, the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts cultivated their lands under the system of Joom. About joom cultivation Alexander Mackenzie describes: “A village settles down in formidable site, and yearly, in the month of April, each family proceeds to fell the jungle and clear enough ground for purpose of tillage. The timber and bamboos so cut down are fired in May, and thereafter on the first token of the approaching rains, holes are dibbled in the ground, into which five or six kinds of seeds are thrown together-cotton, rice, maize, pumpkin or what not, calculated the nature in regular ripening, the whole village bivouacks on the jooms to protect them from blast and bird. Two years later such cultivation exhausts the soil, and when all the good land round a village has been worked out the people move in masse to another site”. [ Alexander Mackenzie, History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribe of North Frontier of Bengal, Calcutta, 1884, pp. 131-32] So, under this system of cultivation neither the joomeas, who would cultivate lands under the system of joom, had permanent right on the soil, nor could they find any practical means to pay any fixed rate of revenue to the authority. Before the Company’s rule in Chittagong, tribute paid by the tribal Chiefs to the Mughal authority was originally realised in kind through roajas or headmen and the amount of tribute was uncertain and irregularly paid.[ Ibid.]
In 1772 A. D. the kapas mehal of Chittagong Hill Tracts become an item of the Company’s revenue. Attempts at collecting revenue from kapas mehal had been made by the Company in the shape of a tax revied [levied?] “on Cotton brought down from the hills, which was farmed out to some second party”[T. H. Lewin. The Hill Tracts of Chittagong, p. 21.] These farmers of the Company’s would contract with the tribal Chiefs for the delivery of definite amount of Cotton annually. Ranu Khan, who later revolted against these farmers, was the contractor of the Company’s farmer who had agreed to pay 501 maunds of Cotton to the Company annually. [J. H. S. Cotton, Memorandum on the Revenue History of Chittagong, (Calcutta, 1880), p. 20.]
But strained relations developed through the Company’s attempt of making settlement with some individuals other than the tribal people for collecting cotton revenue, and especially the Company’s attempt to lease out lands in hilly areas to men, not connected with the tribal rulers. Alexander Mackenzie pointed out that the kapas mehal “was farmed out yearly to some speculators who contracted to realize the tribute, and enjoyed a monopoly of the staple in which it was paid”. [ Alexander Mackenzie, The North-West Frontier of Bengal, p. 331.] These lease-holders, through several techniques of their own, collected cotton from the hill people. In this collection, the amount of cotton was several times greater than the tribute they usually paid to the Company. The farmers deposited the fixed amount of cotton and they themselves appropriated the remainder. They earned huge profit by selling the cotton, thus appropriated, which indirectly helped the speculator to the plains. Again, the Company’s authority made contract with another party with a view to converting the cotton-revenue into money and in this contract the amount of money was fixed. These contractors used to sell that amount of cotton which was enough to pay the stipulated amount fixed by the Company, and from the residual of cotton they made huge profit through speculation. [Halheed Commission Report on Hill Chittagong, 1829, p. 59, quoted in T. H. Lewin, The Hill Tracts of Chittagong, p. 22.] Thus hill people had to face bifold exploitation — one in the form of revenue collection, and the other in the form of speculation. The introduction of an intermediary class, the lease-holders, in the Company’s arrangement with the hill chiefs meant the exclusion of the hill people. This arrangement gave way for direct and indirect exploitation. In consequence of this, the economic life of the hill people jeopardized and they lost incentive for cotton cultivation from which most of the hill people moaned [used] to eke out their livelihood. The inequalities and weakness in the mode of taxation was earlier recognised by the Mughal authority. But as a result of the oppression of the new intermediary class and the speculators, the traditional system of paying by the hill people become obsolete. On the other hand, the tribute as cotton, which was produced by Joom cultivation was not proportionately fixed, and the leaseholders could, in the name of revenue, snatch away almost the entire amount of cotton from the hill people. The cotton, which remained with the hill people even after such exploitation, came to be sold in the markets of the plains of Chittagong. But by the sale process of cotton, the hill people could hardly afford to collect the bare necessities of their life. Because, here also the speculators had extended their clutches of exploitation through monopoly business. As monopolists, they could control the price and kept it at the lowest possible level. They, through market mechanisms, compelled the hill men to sell their cotton at a nominal price. Moreover, the hill people used to barter their cotton for other products. They were habituated in exchanging cotton for an equal amount of other commodities. But it was found that the merchants, who dealt in cotton, also availed themselves of this opportunity to exploit the hill people. They managed to exchange a maund of salt, worth Taka 2, for a maund of cotton, worth Take 6. [Satish Chandra Ghosh, The Chakma Nation, p. 70.] The hill people were left with a small amount of cotton after the exploitation of the company’s agents and they could hardly procure their necessities by selling or bartering that amount.
Diverse exploitation and the resultant extreme hardship ultimately generated discontent among the tribal people. Though, this system of revenue collection from the hill track continued to operate for nearly four years, but it seemed that the tribal people were not ready to carry on this system any more.
The oppressions and extortions of the company’s people produced intense dissatisfaction among the tribal people. Under the leadership of Sher Daulat Khan, Jan Baksh Khan and Ranu Khan resisted the Company’s rule in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Their resistance began when 1776 A.D. Sher Daulat Khan denied the Company’s authority and withheld payment of revenues of his Zamindari at Rangunia. [R. H. Sneyd Hutchinson, District Gazetteers, Chittagong Hill Tracts, p. 24.] His Lieutenant Ranu Khan had organised resistance adopting guerrilla tactics. We get information about the nature of Ranu Khan’s resistance from the report Mr. Law, the Collector of Chittagong. He reported that Ranu Khan and his people made constant attacks on the landholders and farmers of the plains and in consequence the Company’s revenue collection was delayed and sometimes the Company incurred a loss. [Collector of Chittagong to the Governor General in Council of the General Department, 10 April 1777, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 462, pp. 125-26.] But Mr. Law recorded that fact that the Company’s farmers were complaining against the hill people finding their interest from revenue collection declining. Mr. Law also reported that Ranu Khan did not recognise the authority of the company. It was, indeed, too much for the company to safeguard the company’s honour and prestige, it was felt to be politic to resist the attempts of the hill leaders. [ibid.]
The resistance activities of the Chakmas were both offensive and defensive. Through guerilla tactics they had, for some time, resisted the company’s rule and by launching sporadic raids in the plains they tried to fade out the former’s influence and establish the supremacy of their own tribe. It was reported by the sundry Zamindars that Ranu Khan made it a practice of sending his pulwans or armed men who seized and confined their people and extorted money from them. [Complaint of Sundry Zamindars, 26 June 1783, BSR. Chittagong. vol. 506, pp. 42-44] Ranu Khan’s people used to come down from the hills with different kinds of arms on the plains with a view to collect their daily necessities of life in the manner of raids. Sometimes they forcibly carried away the cattle. The party of Ranu Khan did not allow the people of the plain land to bring their cattle for pasture into their areas. If anybody dared to disobey his restrictive orders, a fine was wrested from him on that account. In a complaint to the collector of Chittagong, the sundry Zamindars informed that “they (the Chakmas) have erected neeshauns on the former jummabundy land whose situation is adjacent to the side of the mountains and will not permit the riots to bring the same into cultivation requiring of the riots to take pottahs from them and to pay revenue to them.” [Ibid ] The hill people demanded grain from the taluqdars of Islamabad and if their demand, was not fulfilled, they would try to ransack their godowns. They would not allow anybody to collect bamboos, grass, rattans, firewood or any other article from the hill and if they would ever give permission, a duty would be exacted thereon. [Ibid] The Zamindars complained that Ranu Khan had instructed the Chakmas to seize and lay hold of their taluqdars and chaudhuries and exact nazar and sheedhas from them. Furthermore, the hill people took away the people of the plains forcing them to repair their khamar or field and houses. At the instance of Ranu Khan, “each pulwan so dispatched extorts a diurnal allowance as rozeenah from each Assamie of one Rupee”.[Ibid] It was alleged by the Zamindars that the hill people had established jurisdiction of their own court of justice and inflicted punishment in the cases of the company’s jurisdiction. Even sometimes it was complained that riots of the Company’s territory got shelter in the hills of Jan Baksh Khan if they committed a crime. [Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, The Revenue Administration of Chittagong, p. 199] It seemed that the hill people, in their resistance to the British rule, had adopted more offensive methods than defensive. Probably it would serve their twofold purpose — one in preventing the Company’s farmers from the evil practices and the other in getting the hillmen their daily necessities.
With a view to taking Ranu Khan into custody, collector Law sent a party of sepoys on April 1777 A.D., but the expedition failed. [Collector of Chittagong to the Governor General 10 April 1777 BSR, Chittagong, vol. 462. pp. 125-26.] It was because Ranu Khan had no fixed place of residence, adopting a guerrilla method he used to hide in a safe place, whenever necessary, and attacked when he got a chance. Fifty sepoys were again sent against Ranu Khan, who burnt two or three hillocks and villages. In response to this challenge, Ranu Khan had “assembled men of large bodies, who though ill-armed, harassed the few sepoys in the expedition”. [Ibid] It seemed that in the early phase of the Chakma rising, their power of resistance was so strong that the Company’s authority was hardly felt there. To arrest Ranu Khan’s growing strength, Captain Ellerker, the Commanding officer at Chittagong, sent a reinforcement of one hundred and fifteen newly employed sepoys against him. But they were eventually opposed by the large body of Kukies, who were assembled by Ranu Khan and “who live far in the (..w. e.) parts of the hills, who have not the use of fire Arms, and whose bodies go unclothed”. [Ibid]
The Collector of Chittagong, finding their attempts at subduing the hill people fruitless, anticipated that a new method, if steadfastly pursued, might bring the hill people to due obedience to the Company’s Government. The method was to raise a blockade against the supply of salt and other Commodities into the hills. To make this effort a success the Collector proposed, “to enforce, by every Act of vigour on the offenders, by punishing those families (sic) which furnish the supply and depriving the chaudhuries or zamindars of their lands who conceive at such practices”. [Ibid] In the following year Collector Law submitted a detailed plan against the hill people for excluding them from all sorts of communication with the plains. But it seemed that this plan was revised by the Calcutta authority, who in 1784 A.D., ordered Mr. James Irwin, the collector of Chittagong, to express his opinion “whether, by lenient measures, the inhabitants of the hills might not be induced to become peaceable subjects and cultivators of the lands”.[ R. H. Sneyd Hutchinson, District Gazetteers, Chittagong Hill Tracts, p 8.]
The Company’s attitude towards conciliating the hill people was based on their commercial considerations, first, cotton was abundantly sown by the hill people, and to help the weaving production of Dacca factory the Kapas Mehal had received special consideration from the Company’s government. [See Abdul Karim Sahitya Visharad, Islamabad (in Bengali), S. M. Ali ed. Bangla Academy, 1964, pp. 106-107 S. N. H. Rizvi (ed) East Pakistan District Gazetteers, Chittagong, (Dacca, 1970), p. 89] Second, the company had the necessity of collecting fire wood from the hills for boiling salt. But owing to the unrest in the hill tracts the people of walangies could not collect any firewood. [Salt Agent of Chittagong to the Collector of Chittagong. 23 February 1781, BSR, Chittagong, vol 467 p. 87.] Third, the Company’s coolies were reluctant to cut timbers from Rangunia for the preparation of the Company’s barracks, due to the opposition of the Kukies. [Chief of Chittagong to the Commander of the 22nd Battalion at Chittagong, 24 April 1776, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 461. p. 39] Finally, the Company’s elephant trade was impeded because of the opposition of the Kukies. [ T. H. Lewin, The Hill Tracts of Chittagong pp. 21-22.] It seemed that some of the important commercial interest of the Company was wrapped around the question of place in the hills. So the Company thought that any conciliation with the hill people might bring peace in this locality and safety to their revenue and commerce. But the Company, in fact, did not try to find out the actual causes of the unrest among the hill people and that is why their attempt at conciliation got no favour from the hill people and they continued their endless violent attacks.
In 1781 A.D. it was reported that Ranu Khan and his associates were crossing the Feni River up the bills. Mr. Sumner, the collector of Chittagong, immediately communicated with the Raja of Tippera with a view to arrest him, if he took shelter in Tippera. [Collector of Chittagong to the Resident at Tippera. 1 March 1781. RSR, Chittagong, vol 467, p. 88.] A considerable detachment had already been sent against them, but the Company’s government was not sure that they would be able to arrest him without the active help from the Raja of Tippera. Ralph Leeke, the Resident of Tippera, was asked to procure the support of the Raja of Tippera to suppress Ranu Khan. [Ibid] Records indicate that the Company’s purpose was not served. The Chakmas continued their operations almost unabatedly. The Company once again explored their ability in apprehending Ranu Khan and his people by sending a detachment from Islamabad. But this time Ranu Khan took hold of a Company’s shickdar and ran off with him. [From the Darkhaste of Khosal Chand Wodadhar, 12 August 1781, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 468, p. 18.] Being perplexed, the Company’s authority made attempt to correspond with the object of getting the release of their shickdar, on the one hand, compelling him to pay revenue to the Company’s government on the other. This time the Company’s army created much trouble in the hills. As a consequence of this, a spy of Ranu Khan came from the hills and informed the Commanding officer that Ranu Khan would release the Company’s shickdar and would pay revenue to the Company usually. [Ibid] The spy also informed that Ranu Khan repented for his activities and he would beg pardon from the Company. Most probably Ranu Khan, under the pretense of submitting to the Company, wanted to save himself from being arrested. Ultimately the assurance given by Ranu Khan through his informer to the effect of releasing the Company’s shickdar and paying revenue to the Company was not complied with. The Company, in their turn, tried to cramp Ranu Khan’s movement within a certain route limit by stationing the force. In spite of repeated orders from the authority for withdrawing the army, the collector of Chittagong thought that the recall of the army would not be wise, because Ranu Khan “would not swerve from his former course of outrageous and insolent behaviour”. [ Collector of Chittagong to the Committee of Revenue at Fort William, 12 August 1781, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 470, p. 19] Practically, the Company was alarmed at Ranu Khan’s offensive measures and they could not recall their army. Moreover, they had to supply Khoshal Chand with a proper guard to escort 23 chests of treasure to the Presidency. [ Assistant Collector to the Commanding officer at Chittagong, 13 August 1781, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 470, p. 20.] In spite of the barricade organised by Ranu Khan and his people against the Company’s revenue collection from the Kapas Mehal, the Company’s Wadahdar decided to send sezawal or native revenue collection officer into the Chakla Rangunia for the realisation of the revenues. The Wadahdar’s effort at collecting revenues from Kapas Mehal was materially supported by the Company who had given instructions to the troops to protect the sezawal from the people of Ranu Khan. [Acting Collector of Chittagong to the Commanding offices at Chittagong. II October 1781, BSR, Chittagong vol. 468, p. 39] But the measure of protecting the sezawal was futile and the Wadahdar complained that Ranu Khan’s resistance was the main cause for which the revenues of that area fell into arrears. [Acting Collector of Chittagong to the Committee of Revenue. 6 May, 1782, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 469, PP. 10-11.] So the Company’s authority considered that guards, which were stationed at the different Cutcherries and Chaukies would be absolutely necessary to carry on the public business smoothly. Accordingly in 1782, the company’s authority decided to keep constant guards at the different places of the plains, because they had anxiety that on the return of the troops, Ranu Khan might start operations in that part. [Collector of Chittagong to the Commanding officer at Chittagong, 8 April 1782. BSR, Chittagong, vol. 469, p. 1.]
In 1782 AD. Sher Daulat died, but his son Jan Baksh and his general Ranu Khan with their associates like Doolub, Choree, Kannoo and Toothang Shuckdas carried on operations. [ Complaint of Sundry Zamindars, 26 June 1783. BSR, Chittagong, vol 506, pp. 42-44.] As records show, in consequence of Sher Daulat Khan’s demise their movement, for some time, dwindled but soon regained its strength. Being embittered by the repulsive activities of Jan Baksh Khan and Ranu Khan and consequently by the repeated complaints of the Zamindars, the Company issued a Parwannah ordering the chaudhuries, taluqdars, farmers, and ryot to apprehend all the persons belonging to Jan Baksh Khan and Ranu Khan. By the Parwannah it was also proclaimed, “any person acting contrary to these orders will be severely punished.” [ Hookumnamah, 1783, BSR. Chittagong, vol 306, p. 74.] But this measure was not operative, because the hill peoples were more rock-ribbed than that of the Company’s local agents.
During the period between 1784 and 1785 A.D. the Company seriously fought against the Chakmas. This time, the Company applied their every possible strength to subdue them. By the middle of June 1784 A.D., a party under Major Ellerker was against Jan Baksh Khan and his associates. But the hill Chief went into the interior of the hills and the army had to retire. [Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, The Revenue Administration of Chittagong. P 199] Again in December 1784 A D., a party was sent against the Chakmas, but they were restricted by the authority to advance into the interior of the hills.[Collector of Chittagong to the Committee of Revenue, December 1784, quoted in R. B. Ramsbotham, Chittagong in 1784, Bengal Past and Present, (hereafter cited as BPP), vol. 39, pt. III, (April-June), 1940, p. 83.] It was probably because in the interior of the hills the Chakmas could frequently use guerrilla tactices of warfare which the company’s army were not accustomed to. On the New Year’s Day in 1785 A.D. Major Ellerker wrote to Captain Anderson, commanding the 22nd Battalion of the Independent Regiment of Light Infantry, for dislodging the adherents of Jan Baksh Khan. Captain Aderson was empowered to adopt every means to arrest Ranu Khan. [Collector of Chittagong to the Captain Commanding the 22nd Battalion. 1 January 1785, quoted in R. B. Ram shotham, ‘Chittagong in 1784’ BPP, vol. 39, pt. III, 1930 p. 84.] He was also given direction to move against a Chieftain who, in favour of Jan Baksh Khan, had formed an entrenchment near the Kalapania hills. He was further advised not to slacken his operation until they surrender. [Ibid] In order to capture the posts in the hills, James Irwin felt “the necessity of furnishing masses of boats for the use of the detachment going up the river to act against the posts occupied by the Chakmas, and also coolies, beldars (spademen) etc., for the purpose of clearing the jungles.”[Collector of Chittagong to the Committee of Revenue. 7 January 1789, quoted in R. B. Remsbotham, ‘Chittagong in 1784″ BPP, vol. 39. pt. III, 1930, p. 86.]
On 16 January, 1785 A.D, the Company made a violent attack on the hills. Richard Anderson with his lieutenants Framingham and Feeking advanced towards the interior of the hills and continued their operation for nearly a week. This time they destroyed the residence of Ranu Khan’s son and some villages of the hills using powerful weapons and batteries and took possession of paunch Morrang, Ranu Khan’s residence and some fortresses, But neither the army could capture any Chakma nor could they subdue them at all. Moreover, the hill people adopting guerrilla tactics, had killed one beldar or spademan and wounded one lascar, four dandies or boatmen of the Company.[ For details of Richard Anderson’s expedition, See RB, Ramsbotham, ‘Chittagong in 1784″ BPP vol. 39, 1930, pt. III, pp. 86-87 ]
Captain Anderson retired, but he considered the necessity of keeping guards on the bank of Karnafuli fearing the blockade raised earlier by the Chakmas to commence again. But there were positive and repeated orders from the authority to withdraw army altogether. Nevertheless, Collector James Irwin suggested stationing army at some places which would ‘serve as a guard to the avenues into the hills’. [Collector of Chittagong to the Commander of the 22nd Battalion at Chittagong, 24 March 1785, quoted in R.B. Ramsbotham, Chittagong in 1785, BPP vol. 39, pt. III 1930, p. 89.] In consequence the Company found it essential to keep twelve posts to prevent the operations of the Chakmas. [ These posts entailed a combined garrison of 1 British officer 2 Subahdars, 2 Jemadars, 26 N. C. O’S and 150 rank and file. See R. B. Ramsbotham, ‘Chittagong in 1784″ BPP, vol. 39, pt. III, 1930, p. 90.] But this preventive measure could not stop the hill people from undertaking their operations. And later official records indicate that the hill people, under the leadership of Jan Baksh Khan and Ranu Khan, continued their operations as usual. At their frequent operations, the Company’s local agents were terrified and they sought help from the Company. Narahari Mitra, who was appointed the Company’s Wadahdar at Rangunia, requested Major Ellerker for keeping constant guards to protect him from guerrilla attacks. [Collector of Chittagong to the Commanding officer at Chittagong, 4 August 1785, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 507, PP. 52-53.]
As a consequence of the Chakma resistance, the Company had to sustain an enormous economic loss and it was necessary for them to keep a separate account for the expenditure incurred in their war with the hill people. [Extract of a letter from Governor General in Council. 4 September 1786, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 487, pp. 139-40.] From 1783 to 1785 A.D. the Company’s lease-holders could not enter the hill tracts and as a result, the revenues of this area fell into arrear. As a consequence of this, the Company had to exempt the leaseholders from paying the government revenues for these years. [Satish Chandra Ghosh, The Chakma Nation, p. 78.]
It seemed that the task of subduing the hill people was not as easy as the Company thought to be. Moreover, the Company was baffled by their guerrilla operations. Having failed to subdue them by sending detachment the Company adopted a new strategy to confine them into the hills. This new strategy was, in effect, an economic blockade on the hill people to come to the markets of the plains in order to procure salt, tobacco, dried fish, and other commodities through barter trade. [Ibid] Besides, the Company’s government tried to incite the Kukies through allurement to seize the adherents of Jan Baksh Khan. [Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, The Revenue Adminis tration of Chittagong, p 199-200.] But the Company’s plan of provocating the Kukies against Jan Baksh Khan and his associates proved abortive. The Kukies continued their resistance as usual against the Company’s local agent and when in 1787 A.D. Jan Baksh Khan came to terms with the Company, the Company’s authority had to seek his help to halt the Kukies. [Petition of Sheeb Durga Charan Chowdhury, 11 August 1788, BSR, Chittagong, vol. 491, p. 213] On the other hand, the hill people were getting supplies of salt, tobacco and dried fish from the plains in spite of the Company’s prohibitive orders. [Collector of Chittagong to the Committer of Revenue, 7 January 1735, quoted in R. B. Ramsbotham, Chittagong in 1784, BPP, vol. 39, 1930, pt. III, p. 85] The economic blockade enforced by the Company was successful when the Company posted guards at different strategic points of the hills. Ultimately, the people of Chittagong Hill Tracts were obliged to cease their resistance.
In sum, the rising of the people of Chittagong Hill Tracts under the leadership of Sher Daulat Khan, Jan Baksh Khan and Ranu Khan originated from the Company’s revenue policy on the one hand and the multifarious exploitation of the Company’s farmers and speculators on the other. Their resistance started in 1776 A.D. and continued roughly to 1786 A D. In 1787 Jan Baksh Khan came to terms with the company and agreed to pay regular revenue to the Company. There is an interesting legend [Once Jan Baksh Khan was betaking himself into the mountains at Mahaphroongh. At that time, a pregnant woman while fleeing, being unable to bear the hardship of flight, damned him. Jan Baksh Khan by chance overheard her. This made him, repentant: he went to Calcutta in 1787 A. D. and, asked pardon of the Governor and made peace with the British Government. See Satish Chandra Ghosh. The Chakma Nation, p. 78, Pierre Bassaignet, Tribesmen of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, p. 93] about the sudden surrender of Jan Baksh Khan. But it appears clear that the economic blockade put up by the Company ultimately obliged him to cease resistance and come to terms with the Company.
It appears that the Chakmas, in their resistance, had the help of some Bengalis on the plains. In his letter to the committee of Revenue on 7 January, 1785 A.D. James Irwin wrote that Jan Baksh Khan maintained “in his service a Bengali of the name Mun ghawzee, a notorious dacoit, who was sentenced by the Fouzdar of Islamabad to be impaled ” [Collector of Chittagong to the Committee of Revenue, 7 January 1785 quoted in R. B. Ramsbotham, ‘Chittagong in 1784, BPP. vol. 39. 1930, pt. III, p. 85.] It was also reported that Mun Gazi had trained about sixty Bengalis who were always with him. We can trace another Mun Gazi, officially known as a dacoit, who was sentenced in 1774 A.D. by the Fouzdary Adowlut conformable to Muhammadan law to “let his right hand left foot be cut off”. [Governor General in Council to the Chief of Chittagong quoted in R. B. Ramsbotham, ‘Letters received by the Chief of Chittagong during 1774 from the Committee of Revenue at Fort William, BPP, vol XL. pt. I. I, (Oct-Dec), 1930, p. 10.] It seemed that all these sentences against Mun Gazi were passed in absentia. Again we find another Mun Gazi, sometimes known as Mun Sarkar, in the ‘Shamsher Gazi Namah [The author is personally grateful to Sheikh A. T. M. Ruhul Amin, planning and Development Officer, Dacca University, who kindly, supplied Shamsher Gazi Namah and also to Dr. Ahmed Sharif for his valuable advices.] written by Sheikh Manohar. According to Shamsher Gazi Namah, Mun Gazi, a Bengali, was an employee of Shamsher of Shamsher Gazi of Tippera in 1760’s. He was the chief of Nimak Mehal of Panuya Ghat near the big Feni River, where Shamsher Gazi had served earlier. There is a hat, after his name, Mun Gazir hat, which is adjacent to Panuya Ghat under the Chhagalnaiya police station. During Shamsher Gazi’s revolt, Mun Gazi played an active role. It seems that Mun Gazi and his adherents may have associated themselves with Jan Baksh Khan and kept up this resistance against the Company. To clear the official remark on Mun Gazi as a dacoit, it should be noted that any activity contrary to the interest of the established government is always considered by that government as an act of dacoit or miscreants. However, the identification of Mun Gazi and his association with Jan Baksh Khan still remains a question for further research.
Ratan Lal Chakrborty was an eminent historian. He was a Professor at the Department of History, University of Dhaka.
This article was first published in Bangladesh Historical Studies (Vol II) in 1977.