Nirad C. Chaudhuri

Though the news of the slaughter in East Bengal reached me before last Sunday  (March 28) I did not write any commentary, because I was too upset to do so. Since then even at this distance the events there have pressed on my mind like a nightmare, and I have been unable to do any work on my books. Even now it seems to me that to write except under grim sense of duty, without a full sense of responsibility — weighing every word one writes, and with any object but the lessening the suffering would be unpardonable frivolity. There arise occasion in which a journalist must resist his inclination to air his views, and I am distressed to read from foreign and Indian journalists in India reports which only aim at giving the benefit of their views to the British public, which will do no good to tho people of East Bengal, nor enlighten the British people.

I will not write in this spirit, and shall write with the sole object of asking people in India, and more especially in Bengal, to conduct themselves in such a way that they will not contribute further to the agonies of the people of East Bengal. We can no longer give them any positive help. I shall write calmly because, as I see the matter, the failure to consider the situation which arose after the electoral victory of the Awami League realistically and dispassionately has been an element in the creation of the horrible situation of today.

The most tragic thing about it is that it could be foreseen and avoided. I do not wish to advertise my wisdom by quoting that I wrote in my commentary on the elections in Pakistan, which was published in the Hindusthan Standard for December 31, 1970. But I would refer my readers to it if they feel that there was no means of anticipating what has happened. In that commentary I drew attention to the military superiority of Western Pakistan and to the possibility of its being brought to bear and urged East Bengal leaders to exercise moderation. Though, I also expressed the fear that this moderation might not be forthcoming.

At one stage it seemed that a compromise would be arrived at. I hardly expected that the Pakitan Government under General Yahya Khan would be ready to have talks with Sheikh Mujibar Rahman and go some way towards accepting his terms. I also saw Sheikh Mujibar Rahman on the B.B.C. TV urging non-violence, calmness, and some restraint on his followers. So far as I remember, he once said that not to follow his advice would be catastrophic. So, when the final breakdown came, I was surprised. I cannot account for it. After that I saw his last appearance on the TV, and what I heard deeply worried me. I heard him saying to a foreign correspondent who asked him about the Army. “What can the army do? It cannot suppress or kill seventy-five million people.” He spoke almost in tones of contempt and derision of the Pakistan Army. I could not understand that.

Writing today i.e. April 4, without knowledge of what might happen between now and the day on which this piece will be published, I shall set down my view of the manner in which the outside world, especially the British Press and Indian people, have taken the events, and then state what I think should have been done and should now be done.

Let me give my advice first, for what it is worth: If that is likely to have any chance of influencing opinion– which I doubt. But one’s conscience is one’s own conscience.

My emphatic advice to all Indians and Bengalis is to say nothing that will induce the Muslims of East Bengal to put up further resistance. It would be the kindest thing to them to tell them to submit for the time being and avoid giving further provocation to the armed forces of Pakistan. I never believed that there was any resistance to speak of after the Pakistan army went into action, and the sort of resistance or reaction that is being still seen is nothing which a large collective body of Indians, Hindu or Muslim, is not capable of showing under a sudden fit of horror and anger. This also is likely to be suppressed with grievous loss of life, if it continues.

Anything more foolish than the military appraisements now being given by both British and Indian reporters and columnists cannot be conceived of. Much is being made of the monsoons as an obstacle to military operations. Those who are saying that sort of thing can have had no experience of living in East Bengal during the rains. They do not know that in the days in which wheeled transport was not general in East Bengal, the monsoon season was the time of mobility, not of immobility. Therefore all the married women went to visit their parents at that time and come back before the Pujah. Neither railway nor steamer transport was or is affected by the rains, and whatever immobility is likely is to be equal on both sides. Besides, air operations are not likely to be affected materially by the rains.

But the main point about the futility of these military estimates is that they attribute to the Pakistan armed forces a role which they do not intend to take up. The central Government of Pakistan is not interested in restoring normal life to EastBengal, or in carrying on peaceful administration unless East Bengal people themselves cooperate to restore it. Its object is to hold the country by military force as an occupied enemy territory, without caring what happens of the Bengalis. It has the power to maintain its forces in East Bengal, and inflict greater loss of life on the people than the latter can inflict on its armed forces. There is also the possibility of epidemics and famine to consider. All these considerations would make any well-wisher of the people of East Bengal hope that the desperate but futile resistance should сease at оnсе.

I shall now consider the attitude of The British Press, the Indian Government, and the Indian people, and even more, that of the people of West Bengal. To take the first, I cannot conceive of more irresponsible reporting and writing. Before the breakdown of the negotiations, the British correspondents played up the possibility, even the inevitability, of the secession in such a manner that it must have encouraged the East Bengal leaders, and infuriate the Pakistan Government and the army. After that, with the exception of two eye-witnesses, all others began to report heavy fighting and extensive resistance, and even the possibility of the encirclement and surrender of Pakistan troops, on the basis of the wildest rumours in India. In the last few days, the Press has played up the killing of the Punjabis at Jessore and the occupation of the town by a section of the East Bengal Rifles with the help of the local population in the most irresponsible manner, without considering what effect this reporting might have on the Pakistan Government. I have the worst misgivings about this. It would seem that those are reporting these events are either partisans or sensation-mongers.

Of the Government of India’s predicament, I have a fairly clear idea. It was bound to support the people of East Bengal morally on account of the public excitement. But I have a feeling that all this was a matter of form and not really eager support. In India we have a law prohibiting the advocacy of secession in any manner. Apart from that, the India Government cannot be unaware of its unpopularity in Bengal.

I shall, last of all, come to popular attitude.

So far as public opinion outside Bengal is concerned, the outcry is only an expression of hatred towards Pakistan, and not any love for the East Bengal Muslim. Certainty, a large body of opinion there expect a break-up of Pakistan, and the disappointment has not produced any moderation, on the contrary, still greater fury. But this outburst of feeling will hardly have any practical effect on policy.

The attitude of the Bengali people in West Bengal is a different matter, for though it may not harm the Government of Pakistan, or the Government of India by implication, it may harm these Bengalis themselves. Even from the inadequate reports which I am getting in England I have a feeling that the events in East Bengal are making the Bengali Hindus indulge two of their worst weaknesses: first, that of deriving vicarious satisfaction by imagining that their battle is being fought victoriously by others; and secondly, that of nursing self-pity and sense of grievance. We as fellow-Bengalis should realize that to spread reports about popular resistance in East Bengal and of its success is the worst conceivable mockery of the suffering of those unfortunate people. This sort of emotional enjoyment is unhumanly, and to believe in the possibility of a successful resistance by the masses of East Bengal is an exhibition of very pathetic intellectual incompetence.

In the present situation of what is called for is a true compassion for the people of East Bengal, which will respect their suffering and wish to spare them all future suffering. Against this plea of mine, it is useless to advance the easy argument that if a people are to get their independence they must also suffer. All true Patriotism and military spirit requires that in no case bloodshed should be permitted when the uprising or resistance becomes intellectually a gamble and emotionally a hysteria. Every nation which has the true soldierly spirit calls off resistance when it becomes rationally indefensible.

Nirad Chandra Chaudhuri, (born November 23, 1897, Kishorganj, East Bengal, British India [now in Bangladesh]—died August 1, 1999, Oxford, Oxfordshire, England) was a renowned Bengali author and scholar.

The article was published in the Hindusthan Standard on April 13, 1971